Saturday, 21 December 2013

The Last Word of Socrates



"The unexamined life is not worth living..."
Supposedly first said by Socrates, as found in Apology 38a, it articulates the fundamental and first instinct of every self-respecting philosopher. Curiously however, Socrates adds to the proposition by exclaiming that the listener may not be prepared to accept it at all. But why not?
Here one can identify 'lower' and 'higher' reasons to support the famous statement. The first happens to be that one simply cannot function adequately in daily, 'worldly' life if one ignores what is occuring or clinging to a particular explanation without inquiry and criticism. Since this statement of Socrates' might as well be philosophy's most famous advertising slogan, a word about what philosophy is. The 'core' comprises the branches of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Apart from being a study of intellectual history, it has occupied itself with 'unsolvable' problems and spawning new disciplines once it gets a decent handle on the specifics.
In other words, the three big questions that philosophers ask are: what is there? what to do? how do we know? Now it is instructive to note that one can't even buy the day's vegetables if one goes one's way trying not to examine and inquire, to say nothing of leading the life of the 'wealth-obsessed laity' that is supposed to abhor philosophy and other such 'impracticalities'. Of course, you shouldn't just take my word here, but the catch is that you'll need a bit of inquiry in the first place to begin to realise the fruitfulness of inquiry. But whether you come to see it today, next year or never at all, philosophy is as practical as it gets.
The second and holier-than-thou reason is that the life without serious intellectual pursuits is not worth living in itself -- it is intrinsically bad. Assuming that animals cannot do much philosophising as we seem to be able to do, it comes to be that philosophy is a humanising pursuit, an ennobling practice that uplifts our spirits, nourishes the soul etc. You get the drift. But let's just say that if you've already tasted the roughness of life, you will be led to philosophical thinking more by the necessity of escaping dukkha than to have a childlike delight of puzzles or to be in the more respectable 'disinterested pursuit of Truth'.
So one may paraphrase and say that to go on with life without inquiry is simply not worth the trouble. And no, before you think of suicide, remember that you might just be reborn -- no free rides I'm afraid. Besides, if God turns out to be as queer as theology likes Him to be, and if in the first place He exists, it will surely not be pleasant to belong to the wrong faith. So, start asking questions. Listen to what everyone is saying. And don't be in a hurry to reach an answer. There might not be one.

Wednesday, 11 December 2013

Hindu Revisions of History

Thakur Prasad Verma and Arvind Kumar Singh's 2011 Inscriptions of the Gāhaḍavālas and their times (published by Aryan Books International, New Delhi) is interesting for at least three reasons.

First, it is an instance of the post-colonial Hindu consciousness, often pejoratively called the 'Hindutva ideology', of a radical disruption of their tradition having taken place. For some, various common aspects of the streams of Hindu tradition -- the caste system, elaborate ritualism, sense of 'religious tolerance', Bhakti orientation, inward-looking outward-bound asceticism etc. -- are factors that prevented complete annihilation (as in Iran or Greece), while for others, these were causes for failure. But despite admission of such shortcomings (the turning away from vaiśeṣika and allied aparāvidyā streams is increasingly being regretted), the Islamic project of Jihad is largely held accountable for this destruction.

Although this new consciousness embraces historical analysis, it is still prone to conflate the various streams of the tradition, and sometimes to even brand Advaita Vedanta as The True, Original, Secret Message of the Vedas. Staal recounts one such amusing instance in his Agni (v. II, p. 469) of lay Hindus having come to attend the yajña as if it were a pūjā; they proceed to the darśan, to do a pradakṣiṇā and then to feeling refreshed with the newly acquired puṇya.

Not only do the authors (Verma was a professor at Banaras Hindu University, Singh taught at Jiwaji, Gwalior; see publisher's page) not make any secret of their sympathy for Hindu sources of history (p. v-vi) while also being grateful for the contributions of Western scholars, they also often criticise Muslim kings who were "proud of ruining and devastating cultures, looting and arson, reducing art treasures and places of worship into ruins" (p. 362). That the yavana, śaka and hūṇa chiefs were "admirers [...] and adherents of Indian religion and society" (p. 361) only goes to confirm for them that it was the Muslims, many of them even "ethnically related to the Hindu folk", uniquely responsible for the damage caused. As an example, they point out the Taj ul-Ma'athir (composed after the defeat of Jayachchandra) which attests to vandalism at the hands of Muslim rulers.

However, the second feature is a frankness that can sometimes be hard to find in mainstream (i.e. Western) Indological publications. For instance, although it becomes clear that both authors are striving to develop a (pro-)Hindu narrative, Verma is reasonably cautious (in chapter 2, concerning political history) and upfront honest about the differing standards as far as interpretation of evidence is concerned. Now there continue to be attempts to trivialise first-hand Muslim testimony itself (typically sanctioned by kings as felicitation on occasions of Islamic victory) and use non sequitors to give the impression that destruction prompted by Islamic ideology was led by mere political instinct (see Tehelka's recent interview of Richard Eaton, for instance).

But it becomes a serious matter when this version of history receives state sanction (Arun Shourie's exposés), as Verma is keen to point out on multiple occasions. Usefully, he also counters Roma Niyogi's excesses in interpretation and builds on the earlier scholarship of RC Majumdar, RS Tripathi and SR Goyal. However, their otherwise reasonable attitude (seen, for instance, in their evaluation of the political implications of land grants to Brahmins) is marred by their rejection of the Aryan Invasion Theory and an ambiguous setting aside of comparative philology.

Thirdly, their work's relative recency is striking because it shows that Hindu scholars have not yet atoned for the mahāpātaka of having rejected Indo-European Studies. Not only should this failure already be profoundly embarrassing for Hindus, but they do not make a serious effort to defend, let alone develop, even the 'classical' system. Are readers to simply nod in pious agreement when Verma asserts that "the Hindu society was laid down on a sound foundation of varṇa and āśrama" (p. 392)? He then brings up the usual fluid-first-rigid-later argument for occupational segregation by caste. Citing a Dharampal or even a GS Ghurye when it comes to defending caste-based hierarchies is not productive.

It may not now be surprising that Verma and Singh's work here, its merits notwithstanding, has not even yet been reviewed in any major journal.

Friday, 22 November 2013

Four Types of Sociality

As an additional example of the anthropology that can be drawn forth from pre-modern Indian literature, three Indo-Aryan texts in fair temporal proximity to each other enumerate the fundamental/irreducible types of social relations, varying in number (three to seven) but more or less in agreement with each other, as is typical in most of the extant post-veda literature.

Kauṭilya, in the course of enumerating the types of negotiation, alludes (arthaśāstra 2.10.50, Kangle's critical ed.) to types of social relations as part of the 'narration of connections' (saṃbandha-upākhyānam): parental (jñāti), matrimonial (yauna), communicative (maukha), sacrificial (srauva), interfamily (kula), of affection (hṛdaya) and of friendship (mitra). I go with Raychaudhuri's estimate for dating (~100BC), but see Mabbett's review for more.

The viṣṇu smṛti points out yauna, srauva and maukha as three modes of criminal relation with outcasts (VS 35.5). In agreement with PV Kane, much of the section on criminality seems to belong to ~200BC, Olivelle's speculation notwithstanding.

The first text to make a formal statement is patañjalī's mahābhāṣya (1.118.8, Kielhorn-Abhyankar ed.), for which there exist four kinds of sociality: it retains yauna ('of the womb'), srauva ('of the [sacrificial] ladle') and maukha ('of the mouth'), and adds ārtha ('of the economy'). It is, however, possible that earlier authors would have also mentioned ārtha had it not been the context they were addressing.

Elsewhere, as Biardeau describes in her Le Sacrifice dans l'Inde ancienne (1996), the commentator Nāgeśa lists seven types that seem to be overlapping: svasvāmitva (ownership), yauna (maternal), pitṛtva (paternal), maukha (oral), guruśiṣyabhāva (educational), srauva (liturgic), ṛtviktva (of the position of the ritual officiant).

Interestingly, Alan Fiske, after some "50 years of speculation and 30 years of research" also comes up with "exactly four" types of sociality, but differently aligned than patañjalī (PMT). Comparing the latter's analysis to his Relational Models Theory (RMT), which he says "all humans use to coordinate [their] social activities", while Market Pricing and Authority Ranking more or less map onto ārtha and srauva respectively, it is less clear how yauna and maukha correspond to the remaining Communal Sharing (personal contribution) and Equality Matching (restoring of balance). PMT divides sociality by instrument of manifestation, whereas RMT by hierarchical position, which should explain why there will be unevenly overlapping territories.

Wednesday, 20 November 2013

Galileo on the Godāvarī

Some time in the 14th c., a certain Bhāradvāja named Rāma founded a school of mathematics in Pārthapura (~ 19°N 76°E).

After three generations (Nīlakaṇṭha -> Viṣṇu -> Nīlakaṇṭha) was born Nāganātha, whose son Jñānarāja is the author of the siddhāntasundara (1503). Among J's two sons, Cintāmaṇi and Sūryadāsa, the former wrote the grahagaṇitacintāmaṇi which may be dated to 1550-1580, although Pingree provides 1530.

Cintāmaṇi describes an experiment (see Minkowski's citation) in which an Amalaka fruit and a betelnut are strung on threads and pulled towards the observer with equal force. Replicated on a tower, this is the famous Pisa experiment of Galileo performed around 1590. Curiously, however, it now appears that Galileo himself may have only performed it as a thought-experiment!

Sunday, 17 November 2013

Frozen Texts and Stormy Semantics

One project that the Other of the modern West needs to take up is that of translatability of the Western canon, from Homer to Hofstadter, into its native tongue. Although there have been efforts to translate, say, Shakespeare into Sanskrit (wherein Krishnamacharya is the pioneer), it is striking how there is little effort to translate Sanskrit literature itself to modern English.

There is of course the issue of limited diction: not only Ganguly’s Mahabharata but also various later translations, be they of erotic poetry or of tracts on logic, succeed in giving the impression that Sanskrit, rich though it may be in its potential, is a language of an awfully limited vocabulary and style (compared parochially, of course, to English), so that to explain our theories from even the social sciences to a Brahmin pandit learned only in his traditional lore it would take a special effort of explaining using simple similes and losing a good deal of the sophistication that Western literature today possesses.

There is also the need to comparatively analyse the ‘progress’ in language in the West itself from Ovid to Bacon, since this period is co-incident with that of almost all Sanskrit composition. Now a cursory glance reveals that etymology alone cannot go too far in understanding the historical development of vocabulary. Much academese of today is based on using Latin-rooted diction instead of that of Germanic/Anglo-Saxon provenance (see, for instance, if you can understand Uncleftish Beholdings). Besides, not unlike many a śāstrakāra inventing etymologies pretending Vedic sanction for his ideas (Bronkhorst calls it semantic etymologising, linking it to magic), many popular phrases and acronyms in English today (which the Urban Dictionary mercifully clears up) are of less spectacular origin.

It also seems to be the case that much in modern English prose is simply alluring verbiage, Orwell's nightmare come true, mere chaff the removal of which should delight many readers and many more trees. Of course, in novels this very chaff is treasured for its taste, but in the humanities it is often uncalled for. For instance, Allen Carlson’s verbose Aesthetic Appreciation of the Natural Environment in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, chosen merely because I happened to be reading it just now, may be compressed thus:
Santayana: appreciation of natural landscape dependent on selecting, emphasizing and (re)grouping; no parallel problem for art objects; Ziff’s acts of aspection; our knowledge of art is grounded in recognition of them as artifacts; question here is of modes, methods and limits of appreciation of nature. Object of Art Model (dwelling on sensuous and expressive qualities of a singled out object) appropriate only for self-contained aesthetic objects; the Landscape or Scenery Model speaks of viewing a prospect from specific standpoint, but it thereby limits and misleads appreciation; others include the Human Chauvinistic Aesthetic and the Aesthetics of Engagement (needlessly dissolves subject/object dichotomy). Necessity of limit, classification and meaning; the Natural Environmental Model: the role of naturalists in appreciating nature analogous to art critics for art objects;
Since not all these ideas may be translatable into Sanskrit without coining new words that at first blush will seem awkwardly formed to the native speaker, limitations in language may plausibly be speculated upon to imply a lack of imagination and critical thinking and, therefore, an overall relative paucity of intellect. Insistence on brevity of expression (à la sūtra) does not help either as it can easily give the impression of not having developed a particular thesis maturely. To complicate matters further, Sanskrit grammarians have repeatedly tried to portray their language as divine and eternal, and thereby discourage innovation or at least disguise it as commentarial elaboration of what turned out to not have been explicitly said.

But what I mean by translation to modern English is not mere adaptation to diction that is current (Rasala, Paranjape and some works in the Clay series are examples I'm aware of), but meaningful translation that definitively gives an idea of what it is that the ancients were thinking of when they wrote all their literature.
Except Aurobindo and a few other later Western-educated scholars (Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya and Ramkrishna Bhattacharya come to mind), many translations by Hindu/Indian scholars of texts in even the upaniṣad genre (which is explicitly philosophical), such as those by Radhakrishnan or more recently those by AG Krishna Warrier, fail to enunciate or clearly bring out the variety of ideas within the genre. Contemporary Brahminical scholarship has failed to highlight the glories of its own heritage, let alone productively analyse that of others. Add to that the insistence on emic secrecy (in ritualism and education) and the typical Hindu dislike of writing, it is not very encouraging for an outsider to approach the tradition when correctly educated adepts are not available.
 
As if that were not enough, (post)colonial Brahmin scholars have imitated Western 'investigations' of covert meanings (related usually to postwar physics) in sacred literature -- Raja Ram Mohan Roy's Vedic Physics being a case in point. While there seems to be a way to flesh out an early theory of cybernetics in sociological commentary like yadā yadā hi dharmasya glānir... tadātmānaḿ sṛjāmy aham, it is highly unlikely that the ṛk authors had Clifford algebra in mind when composing verses in the gāyatrī metre, to say nothing of the vaimānika śāstra and similar concoctions.

Even if yāska, the brāhmaṇa texts and patañjalī may themselves have not had much of a clue as to what the old bards were talking about, it is no reason to go look for subatomic particles in the veda. In all this fuss, what is in fact valuable remains unexplored, so that its very followers become enemies of the tradition. Ironically however, it is something etic Indology is slowly accomplishing.