Wednesday, 15 January 2014

Feminism and the Hindu Woman

“Few societies have been so tamasic, so full of inertia and contentment in increasing narrowness as Indian society in later times; few have been so eager to preserve themselves in inertia. Few therefore have attached so great an importance to authority. ... The result of this well-meaning bondage has been an increasing impoverishment of the Indian intellect, once the most gigantic and original in the world. Hence a certain incapacity, atrophy, impotence have marked our later activities even at their best. The most striking instance is our continued helplessness in the face of the new conditions and new knowledge imposed on us by recent European contact. We have tried to assimilate, we have tried to reject, we have tried to select; but we have not been able to do any of these things successfully.”

This is what Sri Aurobindo wrote a hundred years ago in his essay, “On Original Thinking”. India is now confronting yet another Euro-American movement, that of feminism. 

This is an attempt to evaluate Hindu anthropology in comparison to radical feminism.
 
* * *

Regardless of what international surveys suggest, it is obvious enough that women in India today experience pain, deception and helplessness. The causes include of course social, historical, economic and logistical reasons, but the main culprit is often held to be [the ‘mindset’ of] the Indian male citizen, especially the ‘upper-caste’ Hindu man.
Since this man is held to adhere to tradition (consciously or otherwise), it is supposed that the roots of oppression of women lie in the texts that define/describe the traditions. Gender in Hindu society is considered a polarising factor because of tradition that is imposed on them, thereby obstructing women’s well-being. The young, well-educated, financially independent, socially self-defining, sexually autonomous and consciously modern woman is held to be the epitome of women’s liberation, and women who fail to, do not have the means to or do not desire to achieve any of these are considered to be suppressed, oppressed or repressed. Manifest features of the traditional lifestyle are considered to be symptomatic of the unenlightened woman: joint family structure, being a homemaker, subservience to the husband etc.
There are three assertions of misogyny made in connection with the traditional Hindu perspective on women. Firstly, that the tradition has an incorrect view of the nature of women, that they consider women a major source of pain, danger, risk, conflict or evil tout court, that their intellectual and spiritual capacities are considered to be significantly lesser than those of men and that women are to be respected only as virtuous mothers. Secondly, that the norms that it imposes on women are rooted in men’s own interests to maintain domination over women, and that even when there are concessions (property rights for instance) made it is out of a paternalistic concern. Thirdly, that traditional thinking is unwilling to consider women as individuals who have inalienable natural rights and who are equal to men.
A man is always looking to violate what his woman expects from him -- men can be a real pain!
Men are like the most disgusting people around. In fact they're the real problem with society. I’m sure you know what I'm talking about. They may have beautiful wives, well-respected and accomplished, wives who keep their promises and never even think of betraying the man in their life, but these men are ready to do away with them if they get the chance.
This is a serious problem with men. Not having any sense of shame, they go on from one woman to another, even if she is a total loser. They'll entertain any woman who’s nice to them, who'll serve them even a tiny little bit. It's usually only if they don't get any attention from women or if they're afraid of social consequences that they stay put in monogamy mode. Men can't control themselves, that's just how they are.
This is not exactly written by a woman, but it is not too far off from what women do in fact publicly complain about these days. These are the words of the Apsarā Pañcacūḍā except that “women” and “husbands” are changed to “men” and “wives”. Now how many voices of modernity will resist the temptation to take the original dialogue (from the Anuśāsana Parva) as suggestive of a misogynist culture while wryly writing off the passage above as a woman’s personal lament?
Several such assertions, by both men and women, of women’s weakness of mind (due to being especially prone to the vagaries of desire), of their dubious intentions and unreasonable ambitions and of their lack of hesitation in deserting or causing pain to men, can be found in the epic literature. These are rants of men who have, if we take their word, experienced disappointment in their interactions with women, quite possibly due to their own error. In addition, they are seen to complain that women cannot be controlled and that their behaviour is unintelligible to them such that even Brahma seems not to be able to figure it out. (In one such curious dialogue, an embittered Yudhiṣṭhira even claims political science to have evolved from the observations of feminine behaviour.)
This discourse of blame and banter can also be found in the case of Brahma-Kṣatra citizens who fail to fulfill their obligations to the state and instead waste themselves away to vice or misuse their power to serve vested interests. It is quite likely that this discourse reflects the commission of such violations on the part of the accused. It is evident that they had the freedom to commit these acts in the first place and also that they frequently got away with them – although there are many punitive measures laid down in codified law, there is less evidence that such measures were taken, thence the resort to tactics of shame and slander. It is thus likelier that women had ‘too much’ freedom and were not treated harshly upon failing to satisfy what men expected of them than that these judgmental remarks of fear (of the ‘mantra-like charm’ of women, for instance) and disdain (of the power they wield by their ‘beauty, blessedness and youth’) indicate harassment of women who chose not to conform.
The idea of weakness of mind and intellect on the part of women also finds expression in similar dialogues, although most of the tradition’s well-known women are anything but weak. According to many of the men in the great epic, woman, declared beforehand by Bhīṣma to be at the ‘root of all evil’, is said to be undeserving of independence and to be born due to demerit. She is said to be barred from studying the Śruti, such that the Itihāsa-Purāṇa literature is advertised as a Veda composed expressly for the instruction and leisure of citizens other than the male Brahma-Kṣatra citizenry. It is opined that women should occupy themselves with duties of the household and be devoted to their husbands and that their well-being comprises only and exactly this, just as that of the student is in academic pursuits and devotion to the teacher.
These duties and obligations are identified as socially constructed. They are created, as Umā tells her husband (in Nārada’s account), just when a woman commits to marriage. There have been, moreover, two creations of women. The first woman is said to be virtuous, while it is in the second creation that sensuality and weakness was implanted into women. This is consistently explicated by two accounts, the older one of Indra managing the backlash of Brahminicide by getting Apsarā-s (symbolising feminine sexuality) to accept a share, and that of Prajāpati stirring troublesome passions in the ‘new’ women after being pleaded by the deities together to stop humanity from ascending to their greatness.
In the context of law, Yama, a Dharmaśāstra authority of greater antiquity, mentions that in a former age women and men were together educated in the same manner. Hārita, a later author, describes two types of contemporary women: Sadyovadhu-s and Brahmavādinī-s. The latter pursue the same path of education as do men and may choose not to marry and pursue asceticism. This is evidence of women’s intellectual and spiritual abilities being considered equal to those of men in a not greater measure than expression of contempt is considered to amount to proof of misogyny. There has of course also been a utilitarian strain in the advocacy of women’s education: the contradiction inherent in the bracketing together of women and Śūdra-s is recognized and women are recommended academic training and ritual praxis so as to create better Savarṇa citizens. Elsewhere, these ideas were more explicitly developed by Gaius Musonius Rufus of the Stoic tradition.
A narrative in the epic describes the historical emergence of patriarchy. A young Śvetaketu is outraged after his mother is lured by a Brahmin to elope with him. His father attempts to pacify him, saying that women are, according to the eternal Dharma, completely free in their behaviour, and that he should not, therefore, upset the norm. He likens this eternal Dharma (which is “agreeable to women”) to the gender relations among animals. But Śvetaketu proceeds to impose that women shall henceforth be subservient to their husbands and that seducing a willfully married woman be a criminal offence. Pāṇḍu, who narrates this to Kuntī, asserts that patriarchy was thus instituted forcibly by Śvetaketu. Here patriarchy is not justified on grounds of women’s frailty (as Hamlet famously proclaimed), potentially dangerous sexuality (as proposed by Arti Dhand in her Woman as Sage, Woman as Fire) or on grounds of it being necessary to ‘civilisation’ (argued for by Camille Paglia in her Sexual Personae). Au contraire, patriarchy may be said to have emerged more by force of the jealousies and insecurities of men and their incapacity to thwart offending men. Bhīṣma argues to this effect when he says in the Śānti that it is men who are stained with faults and that women cannot have faults at all.
Most of the speculation and commentary in the Mokṣadharmaparva, and also the genre of Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣad-s is self-professedly from a male ascetic’s point of view and does not reflect the methods and practices of female ascetics. It is, however, categorically asserted that the path of renunciation can and needs to be pursued by women equally as men, for enlightenment cannot be gendered. At the time of the Mahābhārata, women are mostly mentioned as wives and mothers and sometimes as ascetics. Women are glorified as mothers but except for discourse appertaining to universal aspects of life (speculations on desire, suffering, rebirth, causality etc.), every individual enters the narrative in a particular capacity and is praised or censured in that capacity. In law, although increasing specificity in instruction is evident (depending on the intersections of class an individual stands on), there is the idea of degrees of generality of moral prescriptions such that truth, compassion, generosity etc. are held to be Sāmānya Dharma that cannot be overridden by any exceptional instruction whatsoever.
The objective here is not to make an apologia for tradition, for if it were so, one would, for instance, be asked to imagine Manu’s indictment as merely an attempt to optimise the ‘natural’ functions of men and women so as to better sustain society, or worse, defend the Strīdharmapaddhatī. Although one can make several more citations of benevolent views on women within the tradition (for which see AS Altekar’s The Position of Women in Hindu Civilization), it is quite obvious that Hindu society was and is still far from being favourable to women. It will prove imperative, for the idea of India to survive and flourish, for Hindu scholars to propose an ‘indigenous’ system of social organization (Pandharinath Prabhu made an early attempt in his Hindu Social Organization) that is conversant with developments in sociobiology, and also to make it appear friendly-to-all (as ‘secular humanism’ and sundry Western imports do) so as to not be impeded by scandalizing on the part of its opponents. The Hindu woman of today has the resources to confidently assert women’s emancipation within the framework of tradition – the intelligent and strong-willed women of the epics will prove to better inspire her than the accusatory theorising of already-privileged Western feminists.
The central point here is that the picture that radical socialist feminism portrays, that of tradition being opposed to women’s emancipation, is an illusion. The suspicions it has regarding tradition are ill-founded and its hope of radical revolution into modernity – which is arguably a religious aspiration -- betrays its misunderstanding of what any tradition is. It has engendered all manner of absurd ideas surrounding gender such as ‘sex wars’.
The overarching question, when it comes to women’s emancipation, seems to be that of identifying the defining characteristics of men and women. It should not be controversial that, on average, men reportedly tend to be systematisers, and women, empathisers, as the research of Simon Baron-Cohen shows. Even if his methodology be flawed, there is enough anecdotal evidence to support the view. It would be more astonishing and more offensive to suggest that women have precisely the same capacities and defects as men do but do not have the achievements that men have to their credit so far because men were oppressing them, for it then leads to the question of why women have been so weak so long.
To posit that it is because of the nature of their physique – whether by inherent weakness of structure or because of the necessity of child-bearing – will give men a major excuse to continue oppressing women. The military has been a starting point for gender-based occupational differentiation, because it is easier to bring a medium-strength male to military fitness level than a high-strength woman who has vowed not to bear children, in turn because the man is less likely to face sexual harassment or socioeconomic pressure to reproduce or to get involved in a relationship with a man in the same troop.
Regardless of which side biostatistics is on (i.e. whether human males and females have the same (dis)abilities on average or not), patriarchy or feminism can still win the day, because neither is especially interested in finding out facts; they are normatively tied to the interests of a particular social group all the while entertaining suspicions regarding its Other. Just as misogynists of bygone eras did not consider it necessary to thoroughly investigate whether or not women were in reality intellectually feeble, feminists today need not concern themselves with empirical studies on gender and sex. Except a few notable promoters of women’s emancipation (e.g. Madhu Kishwar in our times), feminist activism has tended to march from sanity to satiny.
That humans can and willfully do act against what well-established wisdom or even their own personal experience would suggest is nothing new. Now this wisdom usually does not offer any guarantees regarding the future – if feminists today can manage to convince women that they need to be moulded to become what men have been (reducing women to an imitation of men, as Marguerite Yourcenar wrote in Les Yeux ouverts), regardless of how women have been so far and of what they currently desire, then feminism will emerge as victor.
Relations between genders and other social groups are in a constant flux in response to various forces. Intention, good or bad, strong or weak, overt or covert, is itself shaped and directed by these forces. It will prove more productive to concentrate on increasing well-being of women (and of society at large) than to use grouse and guilt to goad the gullible.
Kāla and Śakti dance together but decide their own movements.

Saturday, 21 December 2013

The Last Word of Socrates



"The unexamined life is not worth living..."
Supposedly first said by Socrates, as found in Apology 38a, it articulates the fundamental and first instinct of every self-respecting philosopher. Curiously however, Socrates adds to the proposition by exclaiming that the listener may not be prepared to accept it at all. But why not?
Here one can identify 'lower' and 'higher' reasons to support the famous statement. The first happens to be that one simply cannot function adequately in daily, 'worldly' life if one ignores what is occuring or clinging to a particular explanation without inquiry and criticism. Since this statement of Socrates' might as well be philosophy's most famous advertising slogan, a word about what philosophy is. The 'core' comprises the branches of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Apart from being a study of intellectual history, it has occupied itself with 'unsolvable' problems and spawning new disciplines once it gets a decent handle on the specifics.
In other words, the three big questions that philosophers ask are: what is there? what to do? how do we know? Now it is instructive to note that one can't even buy the day's vegetables if one goes one's way trying not to examine and inquire, to say nothing of leading the life of the 'wealth-obsessed laity' that is supposed to abhor philosophy and other such 'impracticalities'. Of course, you shouldn't just take my word here, but the catch is that you'll need a bit of inquiry in the first place to begin to realise the fruitfulness of inquiry. But whether you come to see it today, next year or never at all, philosophy is as practical as it gets.
The second and holier-than-thou reason is that the life without serious intellectual pursuits is not worth living in itself -- it is intrinsically bad. Assuming that animals cannot do much philosophising as we seem to be able to do, it comes to be that philosophy is a humanising pursuit, an ennobling practice that uplifts our spirits, nourishes the soul etc. You get the drift. But let's just say that if you've already tasted the roughness of life, you will be led to philosophical thinking more by the necessity of escaping dukkha than to have a childlike delight of puzzles or to be in the more respectable 'disinterested pursuit of Truth'.
So one may paraphrase and say that to go on with life without inquiry is simply not worth the trouble. And no, before you think of suicide, remember that you might just be reborn -- no free rides I'm afraid. Besides, if God turns out to be as queer as theology likes Him to be, and if in the first place He exists, it will surely not be pleasant to belong to the wrong faith. So, start asking questions. Listen to what everyone is saying. And don't be in a hurry to reach an answer. There might not be one.

Wednesday, 11 December 2013

Hindu Revisions of History

Thakur Prasad Verma and Arvind Kumar Singh's 2011 Inscriptions of the Gāhaḍavālas and their times (published by Aryan Books International, New Delhi) is interesting for at least three reasons.

First, it is an instance of the post-colonial Hindu consciousness, often pejoratively called the 'Hindutva ideology', of a radical disruption of their tradition having taken place. For some, various common aspects of the streams of Hindu tradition -- the caste system, elaborate ritualism, sense of 'religious tolerance', Bhakti orientation, inward-looking outward-bound asceticism etc. -- are factors that prevented complete annihilation (as in Iran or Greece), while for others, these were causes for failure. But despite admission of such shortcomings (the turning away from vaiśeṣika and allied aparāvidyā streams is increasingly being regretted), the Islamic project of Jihad is largely held accountable for this destruction.

Although this new consciousness embraces historical analysis, it is still prone to conflate the various streams of the tradition, and sometimes to even brand Advaita Vedanta as The True, Original, Secret Message of the Vedas. Staal recounts one such amusing instance in his Agni (v. II, p. 469) of lay Hindus having come to attend the yajña as if it were a pūjā; they proceed to the darśan, to do a pradakṣiṇā and then to feeling refreshed with the newly acquired puṇya.

Not only do the authors (Verma was a professor at Banaras Hindu University, Singh taught at Jiwaji, Gwalior; see publisher's page) not make any secret of their sympathy for Hindu sources of history (p. v-vi) while also being grateful for the contributions of Western scholars, they also often criticise Muslim kings who were "proud of ruining and devastating cultures, looting and arson, reducing art treasures and places of worship into ruins" (p. 362). That the yavana, śaka and hūṇa chiefs were "admirers [...] and adherents of Indian religion and society" (p. 361) only goes to confirm for them that it was the Muslims, many of them even "ethnically related to the Hindu folk", uniquely responsible for the damage caused. As an example, they point out the Taj ul-Ma'athir (composed after the defeat of Jayachchandra) which attests to vandalism at the hands of Muslim rulers.

However, the second feature is a frankness that can sometimes be hard to find in mainstream (i.e. Western) Indological publications. For instance, although it becomes clear that both authors are striving to develop a (pro-)Hindu narrative, Verma is reasonably cautious (in chapter 2, concerning political history) and upfront honest about the differing standards as far as interpretation of evidence is concerned. Now there continue to be attempts to trivialise first-hand Muslim testimony itself (typically sanctioned by kings as felicitation on occasions of Islamic victory) and use non sequitors to give the impression that destruction prompted by Islamic ideology was led by mere political instinct (see Tehelka's recent interview of Richard Eaton, for instance).

But it becomes a serious matter when this version of history receives state sanction (Arun Shourie's exposés), as Verma is keen to point out on multiple occasions. Usefully, he also counters Roma Niyogi's excesses in interpretation and builds on the earlier scholarship of RC Majumdar, RS Tripathi and SR Goyal. However, their otherwise reasonable attitude (seen, for instance, in their evaluation of the political implications of land grants to Brahmins) is marred by their rejection of the Aryan Invasion Theory and an ambiguous setting aside of comparative philology.

Thirdly, their work's relative recency is striking because it shows that Hindu scholars have not yet atoned for the mahāpātaka of having rejected Indo-European Studies. Not only should this failure already be profoundly embarrassing for Hindus, but they do not make a serious effort to defend, let alone develop, even the 'classical' system. Are readers to simply nod in pious agreement when Verma asserts that "the Hindu society was laid down on a sound foundation of varṇa and āśrama" (p. 392)? He then brings up the usual fluid-first-rigid-later argument for occupational segregation by caste. Citing a Dharampal or even a GS Ghurye when it comes to defending caste-based hierarchies is not productive.

It may not now be surprising that Verma and Singh's work here, its merits notwithstanding, has not even yet been reviewed in any major journal.

Friday, 22 November 2013

Four Types of Sociality

As an additional example of the anthropology that can be drawn forth from pre-modern Indian literature, three Indo-Aryan texts in fair temporal proximity to each other enumerate the fundamental/irreducible types of social relations, varying in number (three to seven) but more or less in agreement with each other, as is typical in most of the extant post-veda literature.

Kauṭilya, in the course of enumerating the types of negotiation, alludes (arthaśāstra 2.10.50, Kangle's critical ed.) to types of social relations as part of the 'narration of connections' (saṃbandha-upākhyānam): parental (jñāti), matrimonial (yauna), communicative (maukha), sacrificial (srauva), interfamily (kula), of affection (hṛdaya) and of friendship (mitra). I go with Raychaudhuri's estimate for dating (~100BC), but see Mabbett's review for more.

The viṣṇu smṛti points out yauna, srauva and maukha as three modes of criminal relation with outcasts (VS 35.5). In agreement with PV Kane, much of the section on criminality seems to belong to ~200BC, Olivelle's speculation notwithstanding.

The first text to make a formal statement is patañjalī's mahābhāṣya (1.118.8, Kielhorn-Abhyankar ed.), for which there exist four kinds of sociality: it retains yauna ('of the womb'), srauva ('of the [sacrificial] ladle') and maukha ('of the mouth'), and adds ārtha ('of the economy'). It is, however, possible that earlier authors would have also mentioned ārtha had it not been the context they were addressing.

Elsewhere, as Biardeau describes in her Le Sacrifice dans l'Inde ancienne (1996), the commentator Nāgeśa lists seven types that seem to be overlapping: svasvāmitva (ownership), yauna (maternal), pitṛtva (paternal), maukha (oral), guruśiṣyabhāva (educational), srauva (liturgic), ṛtviktva (of the position of the ritual officiant).

Interestingly, Alan Fiske, after some "50 years of speculation and 30 years of research" also comes up with "exactly four" types of sociality, but differently aligned than patañjalī (PMT). Comparing the latter's analysis to his Relational Models Theory (RMT), which he says "all humans use to coordinate [their] social activities", while Market Pricing and Authority Ranking more or less map onto ārtha and srauva respectively, it is less clear how yauna and maukha correspond to the remaining Communal Sharing (personal contribution) and Equality Matching (restoring of balance). PMT divides sociality by instrument of manifestation, whereas RMT by hierarchical position, which should explain why there will be unevenly overlapping territories.

Wednesday, 20 November 2013

Galileo on the Godāvarī

Some time in the 14th c., a certain Bhāradvāja named Rāma founded a school of mathematics in Pārthapura (~ 19°N 76°E).

After three generations (Nīlakaṇṭha -> Viṣṇu -> Nīlakaṇṭha) was born Nāganātha, whose son Jñānarāja is the author of the siddhāntasundara (1503). Among J's two sons, Cintāmaṇi and Sūryadāsa, the former wrote the grahagaṇitacintāmaṇi which may be dated to 1550-1580, although Pingree provides 1530.

Cintāmaṇi describes an experiment (see Minkowski's citation) in which an Amalaka fruit and a betelnut are strung on threads and pulled towards the observer with equal force. Replicated on a tower, this is the famous Pisa experiment of Galileo performed around 1590. Curiously, however, it now appears that Galileo himself may have only performed it as a thought-experiment!

Sunday, 17 November 2013

Frozen Texts and Stormy Semantics

One project that the Other of the modern West needs to take up is that of translatability of the Western canon, from Homer to Hofstadter, into its native tongue. Although there have been efforts to translate, say, Shakespeare into Sanskrit (wherein Krishnamacharya is the pioneer), it is striking how there is little effort to translate Sanskrit literature itself to modern English.

There is of course the issue of limited diction: not only Ganguly’s Mahabharata but also various later translations, be they of erotic poetry or of tracts on logic, succeed in giving the impression that Sanskrit, rich though it may be in its potential, is a language of an awfully limited vocabulary and style (compared parochially, of course, to English), so that to explain our theories from even the social sciences to a Brahmin pandit learned only in his traditional lore it would take a special effort of explaining using simple similes and losing a good deal of the sophistication that Western literature today possesses.

There is also the need to comparatively analyse the ‘progress’ in language in the West itself from Ovid to Bacon, since this period is co-incident with that of almost all Sanskrit composition. Now a cursory glance reveals that etymology alone cannot go too far in understanding the historical development of vocabulary. Much academese of today is based on using Latin-rooted diction instead of that of Germanic/Anglo-Saxon provenance (see, for instance, if you can understand Uncleftish Beholdings). Besides, not unlike many a śāstrakāra inventing etymologies pretending Vedic sanction for his ideas (Bronkhorst calls it semantic etymologising, linking it to magic), many popular phrases and acronyms in English today (which the Urban Dictionary mercifully clears up) are of less spectacular origin.

It also seems to be the case that much in modern English prose is simply alluring verbiage, Orwell's nightmare come true, mere chaff the removal of which should delight many readers and many more trees. Of course, in novels this very chaff is treasured for its taste, but in the humanities it is often uncalled for. For instance, Allen Carlson’s verbose Aesthetic Appreciation of the Natural Environment in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, chosen merely because I happened to be reading it just now, may be compressed thus:
Santayana: appreciation of natural landscape dependent on selecting, emphasizing and (re)grouping; no parallel problem for art objects; Ziff’s acts of aspection; our knowledge of art is grounded in recognition of them as artifacts; question here is of modes, methods and limits of appreciation of nature. Object of Art Model (dwelling on sensuous and expressive qualities of a singled out object) appropriate only for self-contained aesthetic objects; the Landscape or Scenery Model speaks of viewing a prospect from specific standpoint, but it thereby limits and misleads appreciation; others include the Human Chauvinistic Aesthetic and the Aesthetics of Engagement (needlessly dissolves subject/object dichotomy). Necessity of limit, classification and meaning; the Natural Environmental Model: the role of naturalists in appreciating nature analogous to art critics for art objects;
Since not all these ideas may be translatable into Sanskrit without coining new words that at first blush will seem awkwardly formed to the native speaker, limitations in language may plausibly be speculated upon to imply a lack of imagination and critical thinking and, therefore, an overall relative paucity of intellect. Insistence on brevity of expression (à la sūtra) does not help either as it can easily give the impression of not having developed a particular thesis maturely. To complicate matters further, Sanskrit grammarians have repeatedly tried to portray their language as divine and eternal, and thereby discourage innovation or at least disguise it as commentarial elaboration of what turned out to not have been explicitly said.

But what I mean by translation to modern English is not mere adaptation to diction that is current (Rasala, Paranjape and some works in the Clay series are examples I'm aware of), but meaningful translation that definitively gives an idea of what it is that the ancients were thinking of when they wrote all their literature.
Except Aurobindo and a few other later Western-educated scholars (Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya and Ramkrishna Bhattacharya come to mind), many translations by Hindu/Indian scholars of texts in even the upaniṣad genre (which is explicitly philosophical), such as those by Radhakrishnan or more recently those by AG Krishna Warrier, fail to enunciate or clearly bring out the variety of ideas within the genre. Contemporary Brahminical scholarship has failed to highlight the glories of its own heritage, let alone productively analyse that of others. Add to that the insistence on emic secrecy (in ritualism and education) and the typical Hindu dislike of writing, it is not very encouraging for an outsider to approach the tradition when correctly educated adepts are not available.
 
As if that were not enough, (post)colonial Brahmin scholars have imitated Western 'investigations' of covert meanings (related usually to postwar physics) in sacred literature -- Raja Ram Mohan Roy's Vedic Physics being a case in point. While there seems to be a way to flesh out an early theory of cybernetics in sociological commentary like yadā yadā hi dharmasya glānir... tadātmānaḿ sṛjāmy aham, it is highly unlikely that the ṛk authors had Clifford algebra in mind when composing verses in the gāyatrī metre, to say nothing of the vaimānika śāstra and similar concoctions.

Even if yāska, the brāhmaṇa texts and patañjalī may themselves have not had much of a clue as to what the old bards were talking about, it is no reason to go look for subatomic particles in the veda. In all this fuss, what is in fact valuable remains unexplored, so that its very followers become enemies of the tradition. Ironically however, it is something etic Indology is slowly accomplishing.